When a password is compromised and ultimately leads to a breach,
whose fault is it? Most people would place the blame on the employee
whose password was compromised and argue that they failed to create a
strong and secure password. On the other hand, blame could be placed
squarely on the shoulders of the IT administrator who failed to properly
train their employees on the proper and recommended password standards.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has become
the primary source of technology standards and frameworks. NIST has
developed standards that are utilized by all industries, including the
federal government. As a result, when NIST develops a new standard or
updates an existing standard, technology professionals do and should
take notice.
In June 2017, NIST published SP 800-63-3 Digital Identity Guidelines.
This Special Publication detailed new standards for topics such as
Authentication, Identity Proofing and Federations among other topics.
Included in one of the three companion documents, SP 800-63B Digital
Identity Guidelines: Authentication and Lifecycle Management, is a
section detailing the requirements for “Memorized Secrets” (aka
Passwords).
The following is a summary of some of the NIST requirements for Memorized Secrets:
- Must be of sufficient complexity and secrecy to prevent the password
from being compromised through guessing or brute force attacks.
- Shall be at least 8 characters in length if chosen by the individual being authenticated.
- NO OTHER complexity requirements should be imposed for memorized secrets, other than length.
- Verifiers (the authenticator) should permit subscriber (the authenticated) chosen passwords at least 64 characters in length.
- All printing ASCII characters, as well as space characters should be acceptable for use in passwords.
- Verifiers should not require the memorized secret to be changed
periodically, unless a compromise or security incident has occurred.
While we believe the minimum acceptable password length should be at
least 12-16 characters, NIST has placed such an emphasis on password
length, and for good reason. Consider the mathematics behind calculating
the number of possible passwords given a specific ASCII character set.
If an end user was creating a 16-character password with all letters
both uppercase and lowercase, the total number of possible passwords
would be 52 to the power of 16 = 2,857,942,574,656,970,690,381,479,936.
However, consider the total number of possible passwords for an
8-character password consisting of uppercase and lowercase letters,
numbers and 32 special characters. The total number of passwords would
be 94 to the power of 8 = 6,095,689,385,410,816. Finally, a simple and
easy to remember passphrase for any individual, such as
“IlovedSummer2016morethananything!”, based on the given character set of
uppercase and lowercase letters, numbers and 32 special characters,
creates a number of password possibilities too long to be fully
displayed on a calculator screen.
Despite the clear logic behind a focus on password length, rather
than drilling the word “complexity” into everyone’s minds,
administrators continue to ignore the new standards. For example, how
many banking websites continue to limit the character length of your
passwords? How many retail websites do the same and limit the special
characters you are allowed to use to “!@#$%^”? If the administrators of
secure entities such as banks, frequently used retail websites and other
popular online institutions continue to ignore these new standards, how
can we ever expect our end users to change?
As administrators, we should be placing a greater emphasis on proper
end user education. We should educate our users on proper passphrase
creation and demonstrate for them how easy it is to create a simple yet
secure passphrase.
Until we begin to adopt these new standards and pass the knowledge on
to our end users, we will continue to experience the headaches of brute
forced passwords, compromised accounts, unauthorized information
disclosures and unexpected regulatory audits and breach notifications
staring us in the face.
References:
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63-3.pdf
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63b.pdf